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1. INTRODUCTION
The high volume of non-performing mortgage loans has significantly contributed 
to the financial vulnerability of Hungary. In recent years, the government inter-
vened in several forms in order to manage the escalating economic, social, and 
political problems. The costs of these provisions were mostly financed by the 
banking sector, but despite of these efforts, there are still significant risks in the 
system.
In this paper, we propose to introduce an income-contingent (IC) loan scheme 
for non-performing mortgage loans, building on the recommendations of Stiglitz 
et al. (2014). One of the major advantages of the proposed model is that there is 
no need for direct state intervention in order to force modifications to the existing 
legal contracts, as private parties have good incentives to join the new scheme 
voluntarily. With the help of a microsimulation model, we demonstrate the sig-
nificant value added of this income-contingent scheme relative to the traditional 
one.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 first reviews the relevant literature 
and the main tendencies in mortgage lending in Hungary, and then summarises 
the most important measures taken by the government so far, focusing on their 
costs and effects. Section 3 presents our proposal to solve the problem and also 
discusses the theoretical arguments behind it. Section 4 outlines the microsimu-
lation model and investigates the possible effects of an IC scheme both at indi-
vidual and portfolio level. Finally, Section 5 concludes with the main findings 
and formulates policy recommendations. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Credit dollarisation is a phenomenon when market participants borrow in foreign 
currency, get access to the broader capital market, and take significant exchange 
rate risk at the same time. Eichengreen – Hausmann (1999: 33) called it an “origi-
nal sin”, and they also warned that “dollarization eliminates all scopes for an 
independent national monetary policy”. Interestingly, they also admitted that dol-
larisation may have positive effects as well, because by providing extra financing 
in illiquid periods it can attenuate business cycles, thus can even contribute to the 
stability of financial systems on emerging markets. The authors warn that dol-
larisation can only be beneficial if capital standards, prudential supervision, and 
regulation are strong. However, it seems that these prerequisites typically do not 
hold true for the most dollarised countries. Yeyati (2006) carried out a worldwide 
empirical analysis and demonstrated that dollarised economies suffer from lower 
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and more volatile growth, and a greater propensity to banking crises. He advo-
cated an active de-dollarisation policy on these grounds.
Originally, the term dollarisation referred to Latin American countries where 
almost all loans were denominated in U.S. dollars. However, in the first decade 
of this century, Eastern European households and non-financial firms have also 
massively borrowed in euros and Swiss francs.1 These countries showed hetero-
geneity in terms of their credit-to-GDP ratios in foreign currencies. Latvia and 
Estonia had a relatively high ratio; in Lithuania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Roma-
nia, foreign currency credits were significant but less dominant, while borrowers 
in Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic preferred to borrow in domestic 
currency (Figure 1).
Due to the global financial crisis, employment, wages, real estate prices, for-
eign exchange, and interest rates changed adversely. Hence, the ratio of non-
performing loans (NPL) increased sharply, which contributed to the further deep-
ening of the crisis. In the most concerned countries, where currency loans were 
the most escalated and other macro conditions were also unfavourable, monetary 
policy became extremely difficult as any further devaluation of the home cur-
rency threatened to generate an economic and social catastrophe. The systemic 
risk due to FX loans has become one of the most severe problems in these coun-
1 See e.g. Rosenberg – Tirpák 2008; Csajbók et al. 2010; Beer et al. 2010; Hudecz 2013.
Figure 1. Private sector credit-to-GDP ratios in some EU New Member States in 2007
Source: Webpages of central banks.
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tries, as was the case in Hungary. In this paper, we focus solely on Hungary, but 
concepts as well as the proposed strategy can be applied to other countries in a 
similar situation, too.
3. FOREIGN CURRENCY MORTGAGES IN HUNGARY
At the end of 2014, the total outstanding debt to the household sector amounted 
to USD 24.5 billion,2 of which the mortgage portfolio was around USD 20.2 
billion, or 16.5% of GDP. Of the total mortgage portfolio, more than 23% was 
classified as “under average”, “dubious”, or “bad” and 20% was non-performing 
(overdue for more than 90 days). The greater part of mortgages, about USD 12.7 
billion, was denominated in foreign currency (CHF, EUR, and, to some extent, 
JPY) and about 24% of these loans (2.5% of the GDP) could be regarded as non-
performing (MNB 2015).
The size of the average FX mortgage loan was around USD 28,000 and its 
average maturity was 14–15 years. In line with the heavy appreciation of the 
Swiss franc and the increase in interest margins, households faced growing debts 
in HUF, which together with the drop in incomes and employment boosted the 
payment-to-income (PTI) ratios and also the NPL ratios (Figure 2). Almost all 
loan portfolios have been continuously worsening, but the worst tendency and the 
highest NPL ratio belongs to the FX mortgage portfolio (MNB 2014a, 2015). 
Banks and debtors have made efforts to manage FX mortgages by voluntary 
renegotiations and restructuration of the loan agreements, but these private initia-
tives did not prove very effective as only one-third of the NPLs were restructured 
(MNB 2015). Government and other supervisory institutions (Central Bank, Fi-
nancial Services Authority, Banking Association) also intervened in several forms 
to resolve the conflicts. Some of the supervisory measures aimed at restricting 
and discouraging FX lending (temporary restriction of all FX lending, upper limit 
on the loan-to-value ratios for retail mortgage loans, ban on purely collateral 
based lending, redefinition of applicable conversion rates, and other consumer 
protection type of provisions). Other provisions targeted a more prudential opera-
tion of the banks (capital adequacy and liquidity requirements). However, most 
of the legislative efforts were initiated to assist FX debtors with the catchword of 
“protecting homes” (MNB 2012). Six programmes were launched.
2  Amounts were calculated at the 2014 year-end exchange rate, USD/HUF = 260.
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1.  In the framework of an early repayment scheme introduced in 2011, debtors 
could repay their loans at a fixed and highly preferential FX rate. 
2.  Since 2012, a freshly created new government agency (National Asset Man-
agement Agency, NAMA) has purchased mortgaged residential properties of 
the most deprived debtors from banks at a discounted price. Debts were can-
celled and people could stay in their home while paying a favourable rental 
fee (NAMA 2014a, 2014b). 
3.  FX Rate Fixing Scheme was set up in 2011–2012 and borrowers could join it 
voluntarily in order to defer the repayment burden of the remaining FX loans. 
The difference between the fixed, preferential FX rate and the actual market 
rate is now collected on a special account as a HUF loan. The capital part of 
this deferred HUF loan has to be paid back by the debtor after a grace period 
of 60 months, while the interest part is financed 50–50% by the lender bank 
and the central budget.
4.  The New Home Creation programme mainly targeted buyers of new homes, 
but to some extent, it also assisted home owners in trouble due to their FX 
loans.
5.  In autumn 2014, a new FX loan relief package was accepted by Parliament, 
which relied on a Supreme Court’s ruling. According to this, bid-ask margins 
Figure 2. Ratio of non-performing household loans by products in the banking system
Source: MNB(2014a), chart 58.
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originally applied by the banks during currency conversions were unfair. They 
have to be recalculated retroactively on the basis of the MNB mid-prices and 
the difference should be reimbursed to the borrowers. Similarly, unilateral and 
unjustified increases in the interest rates are also to be refunded.
6.  The latest development is that in 2015–2016, simultaneously with the settle-
ment of loan charges deemed unfair, FX mortgage loans are to be converted to 
HUF in a lump sum at the market rate within the framework of the mandatory 
HUF conversion programme. 
Table 1 summarises the estimated costs of these measures to the banks and the 
state. In order to compare different countries’ strategies toward this problem see 
Bethlendi (2001).
As we can see from Table 1, both banks and the government contributed to the 
bail-out of FX debtors, but the costs of these programmes were mostly financed 
by the banking sector. This is especially true if we also take the bank levy into 
consideration, which is among the highest in Europe.3 It is also remarkable that 
the by far the most expensive programme until now was the Early Repayment 
Scheme of 2011, which cost more than the operation of NAMA, the Exchange 
Rate Fixing Scheme, and the New Home Creation Programme all together. More-
over, as banks were obliged to accept early repayments at a highly preferential 
FX rate, the state both de facto and de jure intervened in contracts between pri-
vate parties, which compromised the rule of law and legal certainty. Moreover, it 
is also clear that the beneficiaries of Scheme 1 were well-offs who could afford 
to repay their debt in a lump sum. It is also worth noting that the New FX Relief 
Package is expected to cost three times more to the banks than the Early Repay-
ment Scheme. The Mandatory HUF Conversion programme is managed by the 
central bank of Hungary, which provides the necessary FX liquidity using its 
reserves. Thus, this measure has practically no direct costs, but being mandatory, 
it is again a retroactive change of private contracts enforced by the state.
One of the most important conclusions we can draw from assessing these meas-
ures is that regardless of the enormous burden levied on the banking sector and 
the drastic state intervention into legal contracts (early repayment at preferential 
rate and mandatory HUF conversion), the total household leverage remained sig-
nificant, therefore low-income people continue to have difficulties in repaying 
their debts even in HUF, hence systemic risk remains an important issue. 
3  The bank levy was introduced in 2010 as 0.5 percent of banks’ assets over HUF 50 billion. 
Since 2010, several banks in Hungary have produced massive losses.
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4. THE PROPOSED STRATEGY4
When formulating our proposal to manage non-performing mortgage loans de-
nominated in home or foreign currency, we followed some basic principles:
 –  The policy goal is to reduce overall systemic risk: The main objective is not 
to redistribute realised profits and losses in the name of social justice (this is 
rather a political issue), but to reduce the country’s exposure to future shocks 
in order to diminish macro-level financial vulnerability. 
4  A more detailed discussion of the proposal can be found in Berlinger – Walter (2013, 2014).
Table 1. Most important programmes targeting FX mortgages
Program Timing Affected 
exposure
(bn USD)
Costs to the 
banks 
(bn USD)
Costs to the 
state
(bn USD)
Total costs 
banks+state
(bn USD)
1. Early Repayment 
Scheme1
from Sept 
2011 to
Dec 2011
5.65 1.08
(total value 
difference)
0.46
(total tax 
reduction)
1.54
2. National Asset 
Management 
Agency2 
from Jan 
2012
0.16 0.09
(total value 
difference)
0.07
(total invested 
capital)
0,005 per year
(operational costs)
0.16
3. FX Rate Fixing 
Scheme3
from May 
2012
6.5 0.09
(total interest 
rate subsidy)
0.09
(total interest rate 
subsidy)
0.18
4. New Home 
Creation Program4
from 2012 – – 0.00003 per year 
(interest rate 
subsidy)
0.00003 
per year
5. New FX Relief 
Package5
2015 12.7 0.73 (margin)
2.73
(interest rate)
– 3.46
6. Mandatory HUF 
Conversion
2015-16 12.7 – – –
Note: Calculations are made using official estimations given in HUF, and conversions are based on the actual 
USD/HUF rate.
1 HSFA (2012). USD/HUF was 240 at the end of 2011.
2 NAMA (2014a), (2014b). The estimate for yearly operational costs was based on year 2013. USD/HUF was 
220 at the end of 2013.
3 MNB (2014b). Data are accummulated until the end of 2014. USD/HUF was 260.
4 Ministry of National Economies (2012). The estimate for yearly subsidy was based on year 2012. USD/
HUF was 220 at the end of 2012. 
5http://www.portfolio.hu/vallalatok/penzugy/mnb_ennyit_bukhatnak_a_bankok_csak_az_arfolyamres_
miatt .202134.html, USD/HUF was 260 at the end of 2014.
Source: Compiled by the authors.
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–  There is a need for state intervention: Systemic risk can be viewed as a nega-
tive externality. Contracting parties (lenders and borrowers) benefited from the 
transaction, while they contributed to the instability of the financial system. As 
a consequence, the costs of the increased systemic risk are paid by other, non-
contracting players (e.g. tax payers). Due to the large number of stakeholders 
and the high transaction costs, it cannot be expected that the problem of nega-
tive externalities will be solved by private contracting. Thus, in defence of the 
public interests, state intervention can be justified.
–  Legal contracts should be respected: Debtors must be regarded as responsible 
actors; therefore, they have to repay their debt and have to bear all correspond-
ing risks provided that they were properly informed before signing the con-
tract. On the other hand, any compulsory retroactive modification of existing 
contracts between lenders and borrowers should be avoided as it runs counter 
to the rule of law. A new scheme can be applied if and only if contracting par-
ties agree on the changes.
The borrowers’ ability to pay principally depends on the repayment burden, 
which can be measured as the ratio of the repayment to the net income (PTI, 
payment-to-income ratio) (Banai et al. 2015). In case of FX mortgages, PTI de-
pends on three risk factors: (1) net income, (2) exchange rate, and (3) interest rate 
of the loan. The basic idea of our proposal is to reduce the sensitivity of the non-
performing portfolio to all of these factors: 
–  income risk is to be hedged via income-contingent (IC) repayment;
–  FX risk is to be dissolved by HUF conversion of NPLs;
–  interest rate risk is to be diminished by fixing the margins at lower levels.
In contrast to fix repayments, IC repayments are automatically and continu-
ously adjusted to the actual income of the borrower over the whole maturity of 
the loan. Repayment is a monotone increasing function of income. In a pure IC 
scheme, repayments are calculated as a fix percentage of actual incomes. The 
maturity of the loan is not predetermined; it depends on the income path of the 
given borrower and the interest rate over time. The more someone earns, the 
quicker he/she is able to repay his/her debt. Another distinctive feature of IC 
loans is the (more or less) direct involvement of the tax authority in the collection 
mechanism.5 
5  For a detailed discussion of the role of IC schemes in student lending, see Barr (2012). A less 
flexible type of IC repayment mechanism was proposed by Modigliani (1976), specifically in 
relation with mortgage loans.
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Until recently, IC loans were applied only in state-managed student loan 
schemes, at least at mass level. However, Stiglitz et al. (2014) proposed to expand 
its scope to other retail lending situations, for example in the case of unemploy-
ment, maternity leave, research sabbatical, or any other kind of temporary financ-
ing problems. Stiglitz (2013) proves within the framework of an optimisation 
model that IC loans are an effective tool of income smoothing over the lifetime 
and that its application increases welfare, especially in the case of high uncer-
tainty, asymmetric information, or other market failures. 
In relation to repayment cash-flows, IC schemes have two important charac-
teristics, namely:
–  Patience: the maturity and, more importantly, the average duration of the loan 
repayments increase significantly, hence most of the repayments are due in the 
later years. 
–  Flexibility: as the repayment automatically adjusts to income, temporary low 
income does not lead to default. On the other hand, high income periods speed 
up the repayment and hence effectively reduce the lender’s exposure.
IC loans are similar to equity financing, when the provider of the financing 
receives a part of the profit (here future incomes). In this setting, outside financ-
ing does not increase the leverage of the borrower, hence default risk is prac-
tically eliminated. However, income-contingent repayments are not a panacea 
to all kinds of financing problems. When we switch from fix to IC loans, we 
minimise default risk, but at the same time we increase the cash-flow risk of the 
lender and we also increase the moral hazard as borrowers will be tempted to 
make less efforts or to hide their incomes (Tirole 2006). It has been extensively 
elaborated theoretically in the field of corporate finance that debt-like financing 
(fixed repayment) is the optimal choice from an incentive perspective, because it 
motivates the lender (the agent) to do his/her best in order to maximise the value 
of the underlying investment. This is a robust result as it is true (1) for limited li-
abilities and risk neutral borrowers (Innes 1990), (2) for unlimited liabilities and 
risk-averse borrowers (Hermalin – Katz 1991), and also (3) for limited liabilities 
and risk averse borrowers (Dewatripont 2003). Intuitively, the incentive-optimal-
ity of the fixed repayment scheme is due to the fact that all the excess returns 
over the fix repayment will remain in the borrower’s pocket, which is why he/she 
becomes highly motivated to succeed. 
It is also important to emphasise that when running an IC scheme, the ef-
ficiency of the tax mechanism is also a key factor. The involvement of the tax 
authority may take different forms, ranging from the complete management of 
the IC scheme (as in Australia) to some services of income verification (as in 
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the U.S.) (Stiglitz 2014). The tax authority contributes to the success of the IC 
scheme by increasing the operational efficiency due to the economy of scale, 
and the enforcement power of the collection mechanism. These two effects are 
reflected in low administrative costs and low default rates, which are essential in 
terms of long-term financial sustainability.
Based on the above considerations, we can conclude that an IC scheme can be 
preferred to a fixed one, if:
–  default risk is a more important concern than moral hazard (e.g. in crisis time, 
or in the case of long-term and unsecured loans, such as student loans, or when 
moral hazard can be effectively eliminated in other ways);
–  cash-flow risk can be reduced or managed (e.g. it can be diversified within a 
big portfolio or the lender has easy access to liquid capital markets);
–  the tax system is well developed or there is a strong commitment to improve it.
In our opinion, default risk definitely dominates moral hazard in relation to the 
non-performing mortgage loans in Hungary. The loan portfolio is so large that in 
the case of some external (or internal) shocks, individual defaults can easily reach 
an unmanageable critical level which, in turn, can lead to a widespread economic 
and social breakdown. Moreover, if many mortgages were executed at the same 
time, the real estate prices would fall significantly, hence collateral values would 
melt down. In this situation, especially when there is a massive oversupply on 
the labour market, fears that people would be reluctant to work harder seem less 
relevant. Similarly, cash-flow risk is much easier to manage than default risk and 
systemic risk. And finally, the Hungarian tax system is developed enough to sup-
port the Hungarian income-contingent student loan scheme since 2001, therefore 
the necessary institutional capacity is also available. 
It is remarkable that in the Hungarian student loan system based on IC re-
payments, the calculated interest rate risk premium is around 1.5–2.0% per year 
and it is more than enough to cover the administrative costs and also the default 
losses. This highlights the efficiency and the effectiveness of its operation (Hun-
garian Student Loan Center 2014). International experience with IC lending also 
confirms that provided that the scheme is well-designed and well-managed, it is 
much cheaper and also much more effective than traditional, ad hoc and face-to-
face renegotiations between bank and client (Stiglitz et al. 2014).
When designing an IC scheme, incentives to motivate the borrowers to repay 
must be the main focus. In our proposal, the elements of the incentive system are 
the following: 
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–  Mortgages are maintained until full repayment: borrowers can keep their real 
estate and can live in their own home while they are fulfilling their obligations 
on time according to the IC repayment scheme. If a borrower is overdue for 
more than 90 days, his/her estate will be sold and he/she will lose it irrevoca-
bly. At the same time, borrowers will have the opportunity to keep their homes 
even if they earn a little for a long time. 
–  There is a minimum repayment requirement: borrowers are required to repay 
at least a given percentage of the actual minimum wage. Experience with the 
Hungarian student loan system also underpins that a minimal repayment re-
quirement helps to keep contact with the borrowers and to make them more 
disciplined.
–  Disciplined debtors have a lower interest rate: borrowers repaying regularly 
benefit from a lower interest rate in line with their lower risk (risk adjusted 
interest rate margins). This is an important tool to attract borrowers to enter the 
new income-contingent scheme and to keep them disciplined.
–  Borrowers possess an attractive early repayment option: in case borrowers 
have some out of ordinary funding (inherited income, prize, project, etc.) they 
can choose to repay their debt in a lump sum at face value without any extra 
fee. This way, they can get rid of the accumulating interest rates. In the Hun-
garian student loan scheme, the early repayments are much higher than regu-
lar repayments,6 which reflects the effectiveness of the scheme in motivating 
quick repayment.  
Thus, the incentive problems in our proposed IC scheme can be effectively 
tackled because mortgages create strong incentives to repay by their nature. Of 
course, setting up a new IC scheme may require the introduction of new systems 
of accounting, asset-liability-management (ALM), etc. It is also clear that switch-
ing to an IC scheme would also influence the risk profile and the long-term profit-
ability of the portfolio, as the scheme would be shifted to a path of lower risk and 
lower return. However, based on the positive experience with the existing, highly 
innovative IC schemes, we believe that these challenges can be met in this case as 
well. In the following part, we show that the proposed strategy creates significant 
value added for both the borrowers and the lenders. 
6  See Hungarian Student Loan Center (2014).
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5. MODELLING AND SIMULATIONS
In this analysis, we concentrate on the non-performing loans, i.e. those debtors 
who are currently overdue for more than 90 days. In accordance with our pro-
posal, these loans should be converted into HUF, and should be repaid in an 
income-contingent way. 
With the help of a micro-simulation model, we compared the operation of 
the income-contingent scheme to the fixed one by assuming that non-performing 
loans are terminated, collaterals are sold and credit losses are written off, as it 
follows from the usual banking practice. 
In principle, banks can also renegotiate and restructure the non-performing 
loans on their own; but this scenario was not taken into consideration for the fol-
lowing reasons:
–  Non-performing loans are overdue for more than 90 days, hence we can as-
sume that banks have already done their best to renegotiate and restructure 
these loans, but these efforts proved to be unsuccessful. As a consequence, we 
can assume that there is little room for further improvements using traditional 
banking techniques.
–  IC repayments are by their nature a tool of continuous, built-in renegotiation 
and restructuring. 
–  The exact costs and the effectiveness of permanent renegotiations are difficult 
to estimate both in theory and in practice, and reliable data are not available; 
our starting point is that operating an IC scheme is much cheaper than dis-
persed individual renegotiations.
Economic models mostly rely on the concept of the representative (average) 
agent. However, in many cases, we are interested not only in the average, but also 
in the whole distribution of outcomes. It is especially true when there is a nonlin-
ear structure between inputs and outputs. Analysing the whole distribution is also 
a relevant issue in the field of risk management, where we typically have to deal 
with worse-than-average scenarios. In these situations, micro-simulation can be a 
useful tool for revealing the inner structure of the problem and to understand the 
effect of some extreme, but realistic parameter junctures. Micro-simulations can 
be static or dynamic, probabilistic or behavioural, discrete or continuous, etc. The 
scale of freedom is large also in terms of the selection of the relevant driving fac-
tors and the determination of the connections between them. However, it is a basic 
requirement in any micro-simulation that the multivariate distribution of the fac-
tors correspond to the available statistical data as much as possible (O’Donoghue 
2001). Michelangeli – Pietrunti (2014) applied a micro-simulation to investigate 
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the financial vulnerability of Italian households. Our simulation, presented in the 
following section, is similar to their approach in many respects, for example by 
connecting different databases with Bayesian estimations, by focusing on the debt 
size and the payment-to-income ratio as main factors, and by classifying house-
holds into four categories according to their disposable income, etc. The basic 
difference between the two studies is that we did not have access to granulated 
survey data; therefore, we had to rely on our assumptions to a greater extent.
5.1 General terms, notations, and assumptions 
The micro-simulation model was calibrated to real-world data, but in order to 
focus on the main relationships, we made some simplifying assumptions. For 
example, cash flows are modelled on an annual basis and growth factors (income 
growth rate, interest rate of the loan, inflation, refinancing cost, risk margins, etc.) 
are supposed to be constant. 
In the new income-contingent scheme, the repayments are due both in the 
active and the retirement periods. The net nominal income (J) of a given debtor 
increases from now (t=0) until retirement (t=N) according to the growth rate, 
which is composed of the real income growth rate (w) and inflation (i). At retire-
ment, a reduction in incomes is supposed to be in line with the replacement rate 
(h- first pension income / last net wage income). Then, the pension grows by the 
same rate as the wage income previously, until the death of the borrower (t=L).
  (1)
 1N tJ hJ 
Loan repayment (Tt) is purely income-contingent, hence it equals α percentage 
of the actual income (net income or pension), until the debt (Ht) is paid back or 
until the death of the borrower at the latest. 
   (2)
The debt of a borrower at the end of year t (Ht) is increased by the accumulat-
ing interest rate (y) and is decreased by the repayments (Tt), but it cannot become 
negative: 
   1max 1 ;0t t tH H y T   . (3)
  1 1 1  t tJ J w i ha t N   
  min 
 
; 1  
0
t t t
t
T J H y ha t L
T ha t L
α  
 
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The interest rate of the loan (y) is the sum of the base rate (BUBOR)7 and a 
fixed risk margin (c).
  (4)
The year when the total debt becomes 0 (full repayment is reached) is denoted 
as t*. But the maturity of the loan (M) cannot be longer than the lifetime of the 
debtor (L).
 min ( ; )M t L *  (5)
We also suppose that the nominal value of the collateral (Ft) is increased by 
inflation (i) and decreased by the depreciation rate (a).
   1 1 1t tF F i a    (6)
In the case of the borrower’s demise (t=L), the collateral is executed, i.e. the 
real estate is sold, and the outstanding debt is reduced by the sale revenue. When 
calculating the sale revenue, we suppose that the bank cannot sell the collateral at 
its nominal value but at a reduced price decreased by a d liquidation discount. If 
the balance (= revenue-debt) is positive, it is inheritable otherwise the remaining 
debt is written off and the deficit is considered as the loss of the bank. 
As we can see, banks have two types of incomes: repayments from the debtors 
and eventually the sale of the collaterals. If all of these incomes are calculated at 
present values and are compared to the currently outstanding loan, we receive the 
so-called profit of the lender (also at present value) (Π). 
  (7)
We must note that in practice, this excess income over the refinancing costs is 
not a pure profit, as this must cover all the administrative expenses and also the 
credit risk. 
Cash flows are discounted at the banks’ refinancing cost (f), which is the sum 
of the base rate (BUBOR) and a fixed margin reflecting the credit risk of the bank 
(b). In case the government provides a preferential refinancing at rate (p) to sup-
port the programme, the refinancing cost can be even lower.
7  BUBOR: Budapest Interbank Offer Rate.
y BUBOR c 
   
0 0 0 0
1
PV repayments PV collateral outstanding loan
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  min ;f BUBOR b p   (8)
However, if the bank refused to participate in the IC scheme and sticks to the 
original, fixed repayment schedule, non-performing loans would be managed in 
the usual way: positions are closed, collaterals are sold out, and the remaining 
debts are written off. In this case, the profit of the lender (Π') is defined in the 
following way: 
  0 01' F d H    . (9)
The difference between the two values (Π–Π’) is due to the extra effort the 
bank takes in order to get repaid by entering into the income-contingent scheme 
instead of closing its positions right now. This is why we call this difference as 
the value added of the income-contingent scheme (VA).
 VA '    (10)
Having simulated the cash flows of the bank, the ex-post return can also be 
determined by calculating the rate at which the present value of future cash flows 
is just equal to the current value of the outstanding loan (IRR, internal rate of 
return). If all debtors were able to fully repay their debts, collaterals would not 
be executed at all and ex-post return would equal the interest rate of the loan (y). 
Otherwise, the internal rate of return is less than the interest rate of the loan. 
5.2 Individual scenarios
The input parameters of the model can be grouped into three categories:
–  Debtors’ attributes: age, debt, LTV (loan-to-value), and income. 
–  External macro-economic conditions: depreciation of the collateral (real es-
tate), inflation, liquidation discount of the collateral, BUBOR, growth rate 
of incomes, retirement age, replacement ratio of pensions, and refinancing 
cost of the bank.
–  Decision / control variables: repayment rate and risk margin for the non-
performing loans.
The parameters of the first two categories are exogenous, hence they cannot 
be influenced by the stakeholders (debtors, banks, state), while decision variables 
can be discussed during the design and implementation of the system and the 
final calibration should be the result of a consensus adopted by all the parties. 
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Table 2 presents the parameter values we applied for the calculations. We also 
indicated how the given representative value was determined. 
Depending on the income of the borrowers and the number of co-borrowers 
within the contract, we defined four different scenarios: A: One borrower earning 
a minimum wage, B: Two borrowers earning minimum wages, C: One borrower 
earning an average income, D: Two borrowers earning average incomes. When 
examining the effects of introducing an income-contingent repayment scheme, 
output variables for each scenario were calculated.
Output variables from the borrowers’ perspective: monthly net (disposable) in-
come (J0), PTI (payment-to-income) ratio (relative to the net income) in the fixed 
scheme (PTIfixed), PTI (payment-to-income) ratio (relative to the net income) in 
the income-contingent scheme (PTIic).
Table 2. Parameter values
Parameter value Remark
Debtors’ attributes
Expected lifetime of debtors (L) 30 years average1
Debt outstanding (H0) USD 33,000 pessimistic estimation2
Loan to value ratio (LTV= H0/F0) 100% pessimistic estimation
Monthly net average income (J0) USD 623 average3
Monthly net minimum wage (J0) USD 270 actual regulation4
External conditions
Depreciation of real estates (a) 2% accounting standard
Inflation (i) 3% realistic estimation
Liquidation discount of the collateral (d) 0.4 realistic estimation
BUBOR (12 months) 3.5% actual value
Annual growth rate of incomes (w) 3.5% realistic estimation
Retirement age 65 years actual regulation
Replacement ratio of pension (h) 0.8 realistic estimation
CONTROL VARIABLES
Repayment rate relative to the net income 30% assumption
Risk margin of non-performing loans (c) 4% assumption
Refinancing cost of the bank (f) BUBOR+0.5% assumption
Notes: 1 The age of an average debtor is currently 44 years based on the portfolio of one of the major mortgage/
retail banks. At this age the expected additional average lifetime for women is 34, for men is 26 years. Thus the 
average remaining lifetime of men and women is around 30 years.
2 The average debt is around USD 28,000 (total portfolio/number of contracts=3.4 billion/120,000). To be pru-
dent, we calculated with a higher-than-average debt (around the 80% quantile).
3 The average gross income in Hungary in 2014 January–September was HUF  234,000, hence the monthly net 
average income was HUF 153,270 (without family tax alleviations). 
4 The monthly net minimum wage in Hungary in 2014 is HUF 66,480 (without family tax alleviations).
Source: Authors own calculation.
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Output variables from the lender’s perspective: maturity of the loans (M), total 
amount of collaterals sold relative to total bank income (F0/(F0+T0)), profit of 
the lender under income-contingent repayment (Π), value added (Π-Π’), ex-post 
annual return (IRR).
Table 3 presents the output variables resulting from the model calculations 
based on the parameter values in Table 2.
 We can see from Table 3 that PTI ratios in the fixed scheme range widely 
between 116% (scenario A) and 25% (scenario D), hence it is not surprising that 
NPL ratios are currently so high in the lower income categories. The major ad-
vantage of the IC scheme is that PTI is automatically fixed and is constant across 
all income categories and over the whole maturity of the loan (20% to the gross 
income, thus 30% to the net income). In this way, by the introduction of the IC 
scheme, the repayment burden is significantly alleviated in scenarios A, B and C. 
This is partly due to the longer maturities and, more importantly, to the expected 
income growth which enables future repayments to increase as well.
The results show that except for scenario A, debtors are able to fully repay 
their obligations during their expected lifetime. Even in the most unfavourable 
case (scenario A), borrowers repay the capital and the refinancing costs, and it is 
only the risk margin (4%) which is not fully refunded. The repayment is financed 
partly from the sale of the collateral (at the end of the borrower’s life), which 
accounts for only 23.79% of the total income of the bank. However, if the bank 
decided to promptly terminate the overdue contract and to sell the collateral im-
mediately, then its revenue would be much less, which is reflected in the highly 
Table 3. Output variables for different scenarios
Scenarios A
one min. 
wage
B
two min. 
wages
C
one avg. 
income
D
two avg. 
incomes
BORROWER
Monthly net income, USD (J0) 270 541 623 1,246
PTI fixed, % 116 58 50 25
PTI income-contingent, % 30 30 30 30
LENDER
Loan maturity, years (M) – 30 22 9
Collateral/ total income, % F/(F+T) 23.79 0 0 0
Profit, USD (Π) 978 17,820 13,657 5,554
Value added, USD (Π– Π’) 14,178 31,020 26,857 18,754
Ex post annual return, % (IRR) 4.17 7.5 7.5 7.5
Source: Authors own calculation.
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positive value added of the income-contingent scheme (VA=USD 18 thousand, 
which is more than the half of the actual debt, H0=USD 33 thousand). 
We can also observe that as the income of the debtor(s) grows, the expected 
maturity of the income-contingent loan decreases sharply. While in some cases 
the maturity can be very long (30 years or more) depending on the loan portfo-
lio’s composition, the average maturity under the IC scheme can be fairly close 
to the actual maturity of the fixed loans (15 years). Collaterals are executed only 
in scenario A; in the other cases, debts are repaid solely from future incomes. It 
is interesting to note that the profit of the lender is not a monotone function of 
the income, because as income grows, the maturity of the loan decreases, hence 
the borrower pays less risk margin in total. Two borrowers on minimal wages 
(scenario B) are able to fully repay their debt, but only in 30 years, therefore they 
pay a lot of risk premium and this is why they become the most profitable clients. 
Not surprisingly, the value added is closely related to the profit of the lender, thus 
it shows a similar pattern. The ex-post return equals the interest rate of the loan 
(7.5%) in scenarios B, C and D, where debtors fully repay. However, in scenario 
A, the ex-post return is somewhat lower, because the debtor will not be able to re-
pay all its obligations and a part of it will be written off as the loss of the lender.
Of course, in special cases, the bank might get into worse scenarios than pre-
sented above, for example in the case of higher LTV, early death of the debtor, 
lower incomes, or due to external parameters changing adversely relative to our 
assumptions. From this aspect, the most powerful macro-economic factors are 
the growth rate of real incomes and the real interest rates; more precisely, it is 
their long-term relation that matters the most. In our model, we prudently as-
sumed a real income growth rate of 0.5% being lower than the real interest rate 
(4%–3%=1%).
5.3 Portfolio effects
In order to analyse the portfolio level effects of the introduction of the IC scheme, 
we simulated the total non-performing mortgage portfolio presently denominated 
in foreign currency described in the reports of the MNB (MNB 2014a, 2015). This 
portfolio includes about 120,000 contracts with a total volume of USD 3.4 bil-
lion. The estimated structure of the portfolio is presented in Table 4.
Unfortunately, in the other dimensions, detailed statistics were not available. 
Hence, when building up the micro-simulation model, parameters were adjusted 
to the available aggregated statistics as closely as possible. If no data were avail-
able, then we made realistic assumptions.  
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We created a population of borrowers by simulating their main attributes: age, 
debt, LTV, and income,9 while external macro-economic conditions and control 
variables presented in Table 2 remained unchanged. We also assumed that the 
four attributes were independent from each other. In reality, the relationship be-
tween income and the other three variables (age, debt, LTV) is rather positive 
as older people typically earn more and high earners can get higher debt and 
higher LTV. The more these correlations are strong, the lower potential loss-
es are, because high ages, debts and LTVs are expected to be compensated by 
higher incomes. Hence, if we set aside correlations and suppose independencies, 
the simulation can be considered as more or less pessimistic, which meets the 
requirement of prudency.
Age: We assumed that the age of the debtors follows a normal distribution 
with a mean of 44 years and a standard deviation of 6 years. We also introduced 
a lower bound for age at 25 years. For the sake of simplicity, we assumed that 
debtors within the same contract were completely identical. We supposed that all 
borrowers work until the age of 65, and then live 9 years as pensioners.10 Early 
death was not modelled because this type of risk is hedged via life insurance con-
tracts corresponding to the loan contract.
Debt (H0): Debt size was estimated according to Table 4. 
8  We supposed that in the case of the non-performing loans, the weights of the categories are the 
same as in the case of the whole FX mortgage portfolio.
9  Simulations were run in an Excel VBA program for 10,000 loan contracts, and this population 
was then multiplied by 12.
10  This is consistent with Table 2, remark 1.
Table 4. The estimated structure of the non-performing FX mortgage portfolio (2013, USD)8
Debt Frequency, % Number of contracts Portfolio size
6,000 14 16,800 100,800,000
16,000 32 38,400 614,400,000
26,000 24 28,800 748,800 000
36,000 12 14,400 518,400,000
50,000 11 13,200 660,000,000
70,000 4 4,800 336,000,000
100,000 2 2,400 240,000,000
140,000 1 1,200 168,000,000
100 120,000 3,386,400,000
Source: MNB (2011: 15).
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Loan to value ratio (LTV): We assumed that the distribution of the LTV ratios 
is normal too, with a mean of 1.2 and a standard deviation of 0.2. As LTV cannot 
be negative, we introduced a lower bound of 0. 
Monthly net incomes (J0): Although there are publicly available reports on the 
distribution of the incomes of the entire Hungarian population, these statistics 
cannot be used here because the income of this special group (non-performing 
borrowers) might be totally different; certainly, lower income categories are 
over-represented. Thus, as no reliable statistics on the income of non-performing 
borrowers were found, we assumed that only four income scenarios (A-B-C-D) 
existed, exactly the ones we defined in the previous section. Frequencies were 
estimated according to some experts’ opinion (Table 5). 
Income paths were simulated by supposing that the annual real wage growth 
rates were independent and normally distributed stochastic variables with a mean 
of 0.5% and a standard deviation of 0.2%. 
Having created an artificial but realistic population, we calculated the per-
formance measures from the lender’s point of view as defined in Table 3. In this 
parameter-setting, 67% of the borrowers were able to fully repay in their lifetime 
and there was no need for selling out the collateral. Moreover, those individuals 
who could not fully repay their obligations proved to be profitable for the bank 
in 87% of the cases because collaterals were enough to compensate the capital 
and its accumulated financing cost, and even a part of the risk premium. If we 
take a helicopter view of the whole portfolio, it turns out that the aggregate profit 
(Π) is around USD 0.45 billion, which is more than 13% of the portfolio’s actual 
face value.
However, if, contrary to our proposal, the banking sector decides not to partici-
pate in this programme, and defaulted debt contracts are terminated immediately 
by executing the mortgages at a liquidation discount of 40%, then according to 
our calculations about 48% of the portfolio face value would be immediately 
lost (USD 1.64 billion).11 Thus, if our assumptions hold, the value added result-
11  The price impact of the increased selling activity was not taken into consideration.
Table 5. Estimated frequency of the income scenarios
Scenarios A
one min. wage
B
two min. wages
C
one avg. income
D
two avg. incomes
Monthly net income, 
USD (J0)
270 541 623 1,246
Frequency, % 30 40 20 10
Source: Estimation of the authors.
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ing from the fix-to-IC switch is 0.45+(–1.64)=USD 2.1 billion. It is important to 
emphasise that the introduction of the IC scheme does not increase the credit risk 
of the banks, as all the risks are already present in the system. 
Of course, this impressive performance is also due to the cheap state refinanc-
ing. It is worth calculating the costs of this support affecting the state budget. If 
the banks’ refinancing costs are around BUBOR+2%=3.5%+2%=5.5%, the state 
refinancing at 4% induces an annual public cost of 1.5% based on the portfolio’s 
face value. Therefore, in the first years the total public costs would be around 
USD 0.05 billion, but later on as debts are gradually paid back it will significantly 
decrease. However, these costs are not effective while banks are able to pay back 
the refinancing loans (no default event occurs) because the interest rate of the 
refinancing loans (4%) exceeds Treasury bond rates (3.5%). In our opinion some 
state support in the form of cheap refinancing can be justified, especially if we 
also consider the spillover effects.
Finally, in order to gain an insight into the inner structure of the portfolio 
performance, it is also worth examining the distribution of the output variables 
(Figures 3, 4 and 5).
It can be seen in Figure 3 that loans are repaid within 35 years, except for 
those that cannot be repaid at all. Moreover, 38% of the loans are repaid within 10 
years; hence, the average maturity of the repaid loans is fairly short, being around 
15 years, exactly as in the fixed scheme. In case the borrowers take advantage of 
their early repayment option, maturities can be even shorter.12 Another advantage 
of the IC scheme is that the sales of the collaterals are postponed and dispersed 
in time; therefore, adverse price impacts on the real estate market are minimised. 
The weight of collateral revenues is remarkably low within the total income of 
the bank; cash-flows are dominated by the income-contingent repayments. 
12  We did not model the early repayment behaviour of the debtors.
Figure 3. Maturities and the weight of the collateral
Source: Micro-simulation.
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Figure 4 presents the distribution of the lender’s profit and the added value of 
the IC scheme relative to the fixed one.
In more than 80% of the cases, the lender’s profit on one contract is between 
USD 0 and 20 thousand (the average face value is USD 28 thousand). The val-
ue added is calculated as the difference between profits in the IC and the fixed 
schemes. Given that profits in the fixed scheme are negative (due to the forced 
sale of the collaterals), value added of the IC scheme is even higher than the 
profit. Both Figure 4 and Figure 5 underpin that banks can improve their posi-
tions significantly by entering the IC scheme.
As we could also see in Table 3, when debtors fully repay on finite time ho-
rizon, the ex-post annual return of the lender equals the interest rate of the loan 
(7.5% in our model). Of course, there are some cases when the ex-post annual 
return is negative, but this risk is practically negligible.
Figure 4. Profits and the value added of the IC scheme
Source: Micro-simulation.
Figure 5. Ex post annual returns
Source: Micro-simulation.
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
We showed that if certain conditions hold, IC repayments are more favourable 
than fixed ones not only in student lending, but also in the case of non-performing 
mortgage loans. We proposed to convert the Hungarian non-performing house-
hold mortgages denominated in foreign currencies into HUF, to lower the interest 
rate margins, and, most importantly, to introduce income-contingent repayments 
for the remaining debts. This would be a voluntary scheme to which contractors 
(banks and borrowers) can switch only if both of them agree. 
We have also shown within the framework of a micro-simulation model that 
with the help of an income contingent (IC) scheme, the vast majority of non-
performing loans can be repaid, while borrowers are not overburdened. The pro-
posed scheme is attractive for all the stake-holders.
It is attractive for the borrowers because payment-to-income (PTI) ratios in the 
lower income categories could drop to one-third or even to one-fourth. Default 
risk is practically eliminated, while low earning borrowers can keep their home 
over their lifetime, and the property remains inheritable to their children.
It is attractive for the lenders because low PTI ratios and strong incentives 
to repay (mortgage right, minimum repayment requirement, lower interest rates 
for good borrowers, and early repayment option) lead to low NPL ratios, which 
creates high value added for the banks (USD 2.1 billion for a portfolio of USD 
3.4 billion). Cash-flow risk can be managed by portfolio diversification and/or 
by refinancing on the capital markets or by the state. The price impact on the FX 
market and on the real estate market is also minimised as HUF conversions and 
sales of the collaterals are postponed and dispersed over time. Finally, it is also 
clear that this mass volume income-contingent repayment is much cheaper than 
endless bilateral negotiations between bank and client.
It is also attractive for the state because systemic risk is effectively reduced at 
a fairly low public cost. State support to the scheme consists of the operation of 
the collection mechanism by developing the tax system, the cheap refinancing for 
the banks, and assisting HUF conversions in order to attenuate the price impact 
on the FX markets. In this way, the state can exploit synergies between banking 
system, tax system, student lending, etc., and can attenuate negative externali-
ties without intervening into private contracts by force. The technical problems 
of practical implementation can also be resolved, based on the international and 
Hungarian experience with student lending.
Our proposal, first presented in Berlinger – Walter (2013, 2014), was discussed 
among experts, but it was not accepted by the Hungarian authorities. By May 
2015, the conversion of foreign debt loans and the compensation of exchange 
rate and interest rate changes were accomplished. According to the first unofficial 
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MNB comments, the average decrease in debts and debt services is significantly 
less than it was expected: only 20% instead of the initially forecasted 30%. This 
raises the question whether these measures have really solved the problem of 
non-performing mortgages, or whether new packages will become necessary in 
the near future again. We believe that the roots of solvency problems (too high 
indebtedness, weak and volatile incomes) are still present, and thus the idea of the 
implementation of an IC scheme remains a topical issue.  
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